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1 Introduction
Forging a vertical linkage between formal and informal credit markets is considered to be one of
many different ways to pursue a liberalized policy in the financial markets in emerging economies.
Under this policy, formal credit is supplied to the informal sector lenders with a view to enhance
competition between them so that the ultimate borrowers receive credit at a reasonable interest
rate. Here the informal sector lenders act as financial intermediaries between the formal credit
agency and the final borrowers of credit. This policy has been experimented with some success in
the Philippines (see Umali (1990)).
There is a small body of theoretical literature that analyses the economic effects of building such
a vertical linkage. Some papers in this literature discuss as to why the policy may not ultimately
be able to succeed. Hoff and Stiglitz (1996) have argued that this policy may be counterproductive
and actually raise the informal sector interest rate since extending formal credit to the informal
lenders paves the way for the entry of new lenders in the informal credit market which in turn
makes loan recovery from the borrowers more difficult and this leads to an increase in the cost of
loan administration for every lender. Bose (1998) has shown that the policy of vertical linkage may
in fact produce adverse effects on the borrowing terms faced by the small and marginal borrowers
He considered a situation where the informal sector lenders have asymmetric information regarding
the borrowers’ ability to repay loans and competition between them determines the interest rate
in the informal credit market. If in such a situation a credit subsidy policy is undertaken, it would
enable the better-informed informal sector lender to attract better borrowers with lower probability
of default and consequently leave the reaming borrowers with high probability of default for the
other lender. As a result, the second lender may not find it profitable to continue the lending
operation and may finally leave the credit market. In such a situation, the borrowing terms in
the informal credit market will deteriorate. Furthermore, Floro and Ray (1997) have shown that a
credit flow to the lenders in the informal credit market may strengthen the ability and incentive of
the informal lenders to collude among themselves, which would result in worse terms faced by the
borrowers in the informal credit market. Finally, Chaudhuri and Dastidar (CD hereafter) (2011)
have shown that presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor
behind the failure of the policy of vertical linkage.
The present work is an extension of CD (2011). We develop a model of vertical linkage between
the formal and informal credit markets that highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution
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of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move
sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on
the informal interest rate. The analysis distinguishes between two different ways of designing a
credit subsidy policy. If a credit subsidy policy is undertaken through an increase in the supply
of institutional credit, it is likely to increase the competitiveness in the informal credit market
and lower the informal sector interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This result is
different from that of the CD (2011) work. The present paper then goes on to show that any change
in the formal sector interest rate has no effect on the informal interest. However, an anticorruption
measure (increase in penalty) unambiguously lowers the interest rate in the informal credit market.
Finally, the effects of alternative policies on the incomes of different economic agents have also been
examined. These effects have not been examined in CD (2011).
2 The Model
We closely follow CD(2011). There is a rural credit market with a single formal credit agency (a
bank). The bank official is given the task of distributing a given amount, C, of bank credit to
people who would re-lend the money to the farmers of the village. Let N denote the very large
number of homogeneous new moneylenders applying for bank credit. But how many of them, n,
would ultimately get the formal credit is decided by the bank official. The bank officer demands a
bribe z per unit of bank credit given to the fringe moneylenders. This amount is withheld as ’cut
money’ from the bank credit at the time of disbursal.
There are three stages of the game. In the first stage, the dominant moneylender determines
the informal interest, i, as he knows the behavioural patterns of the bank official and the fringe
moneylenders. In the second stage of the game the bank official decides on the bribing rate, z, and
the number of new moneylenders, n who actually get the credit. In the final stage of the game, each
fringe moneylender determines the amount of formal credit that he would apply for. The amount
of formal credit that each new moneylender receives, CF , is also determined in the process.
We now turn to analyze the behaviour and payoff function of the different economic agents in
this model.
Fringe moneylenders We start with the fringe moneylenders who move in the third stage. Each
fringe moneylender decides the amount of formal credit that he would apply for. If a fringe money
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lender is formally approved of CF amount of credit, the amount that he actually gets in hand is
CF (1− z) as an amount zCF is to be paid as bribe to the bank official. He can now use this
amount i.e. (1− z)CF to disburse as a loan and earn an interest rate of i on it. Let r be the formal
interest rate, and f (x) be the cost of loan enforcement. It’s given that f (0) = 0. Also f ′ (x) > 0
and f ′′ (x) > 0 for all x > 0. Since this person has been formally approved of CF amount of credit,
he has to pay back (1 + r)CF to the bank.
The income of each fringe moneylender is therefore
Y F = [(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)]CF − f
(
CF (1− z)
)
.
We assume that the reservation income of each moneylender is zero. We now proceed to the bank
official.
The bank official The bank official moves in the second stage and chooses the bribing rate, z,
and the number of new moneylenders, n, who actually get the credit. Let CF be the formal credit
received by each of the n fringe moneylenders in the third stage. Let P (z) be the probability of
that the bank official gets caught if he takes a bribe. P (.) satisfies the following properties. (i)
P (0) = 0, (ii) P ′ (z) > 0 ∀z > 0 and (iii) P ′′ (z) > 0 ∀z > 0. K is the fixed money value of
penalty in the case of detection of the bribery. The bank official is assumed to be risk neutral and
his expected income is
Y O = nzCF − P (z)K.
It may be noted that the bank official while choosing z and n must see to it that Y F ≥ 0 (the
reservation income constraint of each fringe money lender) and C ≥ nCF (the credit constraint
that he himself faces).
The dominant moneylender The dominant moneylender moves in the first stage and chooses
the informal interest, i. Let g be the opportunity interest rate of the dominant money lender.
F (i) is the aggregate demand function for credit by the ultimate borrowers (farmers). We assume
F ′ (.) < 0 and F ′′ (.) ≤ 0. Note that n (1− z)CF is the aggregate supply of actual formal credit
(after bribe has been paid) going to the fringe moneylenders. Since this amount is supplied to
the farmers as loans, the net demand function of credit faced by the dominant moneylender is
F (i)− n (1− z)CF . Hence, the income of the dominant moneylender is
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YM = (i− g)
[
F (i)− n (1− z)CF
]
.
We also assume that the dominant moneylender has no cost of enforcing loan repayment. This can
be justified by the hierarchical structure of a rural society where the dominant moneylender enjoys
enormous clout.
3 Solving for the three stage game
3.0.1 Third stage
The fringe moneylender moves and chooses CF ≥ 0 to maximise
Y F = [(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)]CF − f
(
CF (1− z)
)
.
The first and second order conditions for maximisation are as follows.
Y FC =
∂Y F
∂C
= (1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)− f ′
(
CF (1− z)
)
(1− z) = 0−− (1)
and Y FCC =
∂2Y F
∂C2
= −f ′′
(
CF (1− z)
)
(1− z)2 < 0−−− (1a)
Note that the second order condition
(
Y FCC < 0
)
is always satisfied since f ′′ (.) > 0. Solving (1)
and (1a) we get CF . Note that if (1 + i) (1− z) − (1 + r) < 0 then CF = 0. Also, CF > 0 =⇒
(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r) > 0. Therefore
Y F = [(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)]CF−f
(
CF (1− z)
)
> 0 =⇒ (1 + i) (1− z)−(1 + r) > 0−−−− (2)
From (1) we get that if CF > 0 then
(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r) = f ′
(
CF (1− z)
)
(1− z) .
That is, if CF > 0 we get that (from (1))
CF =
1
1− z
f ′−1
(
1 + i−
1 + r
1− z
)
−−− (3)
Note that CFr =
∂CF
∂r
< 0 (since f ′′ (.) > 0)−−−−(3a)
and the sign of CFz =
∂CF
∂z
is ambiguous.−−−− (3b)
5
3.0.2 Second stage
We now fold the game backwards and solve the second stage. In this stage the bank official moves
and chooses z and n ≤ N to maximise Y O subject to Y F ≥ 0 and C ≥ nCF . Using (2) it may be
noted that the official maximises
Y O = nzCF − P (z)K
s.t. g1 (z, n) = −Y F ≤ 0
g2 (z, n) = nCF −C ≤ 0
and g3 (z, n) = n−N ≤ 0
The relevant Lagrangian is
L = nzCF − P (z)K + λ1Y
F + λ2
(
C − nCF
)
+ λ3 (N − n)
In an interior equilibrium, the 1OCs and the complementary slackness conditions are as follows.
Lz =
∂L
∂z
= nCF + nzCFz − P
′ (z)K + λ1Y
F
z − nλ2C
F
z = 0−−−−(4a)
Ln =
∂L
∂n
= zCF − λ2C
F − λ3 = 0−−−− (4b)
Lλ1 =
∂L
∂λ1
= Y F ≥ 0−−−− (4c)
λ1
(
∂L
∂λ1
)
= λ1Y
F = 0−−−− (4d)
Lλ2 =
∂L
∂λ2
= C − nCF ≥ 0−−−− (4e)
λ2
(
∂L
∂λ2
)
= λ2
(
C − nCF
)
= 0−−−− (4f)
Lλ3 =
∂L
∂λ3
= N − n ≥ 0−−−−− (4g)
λ3
∂L
∂λ3
= λ3 (N − n) = 0−−−− (4h)
Note that in any non-trivial equilibrium Y F > 0 and this implies (from 4d) that λ1 = 0. Since we
have assumed that N is very large, in equilibrium n < N . This means λ3 = 0 (from 4h).
In equilibrium C − nCF = 0. This is because of the following reason. If C − nCF > 0 then
the official can increase his payoff simply by increasing n. Therefore, C − nCF > 0 cannot arise in
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equilibrium. Hence, the binding constraint is the second constraint (which is g2 (.)). Note that
g2z =
∂g2 (.)
∂z
= nCFz and
g2n =
∂g2 (.)
∂n
= CF .
Therefore the second order condition for the maximisation is as follows.
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Lzz Lzn −g
2
z
Lnz Lnn −g
2
n
−g2z −g
2
n 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
> 0
Remark 1 It may be noted that the second order condition will be valid only if P ′′ (.) > 0 (which
we have assumed to be the case).
Then using the fact that λ1 = 0 = λ3 and that g
2 (.) = 0 in equilibrium, we get the following
from (4a) to (4h).
nCF + n (z − λ2)C
F
z − P
′ (z)K = 0−−−−(5a)
(z − λ2)C
F = 0−−−− (5b)
C = nCF −−− (5c)
From (5a) to (5c) we can solve for z, λ2 and n. That is, we will get z and n as functions of i
(which has been chosen by the existing moneylender in the first stage), C and r. Note that C and
r are given exogenously.
From (5b) we get that z − λ2 = 0, since C
F > 0 (in any non-trivial equilibrium) . This implies
(from 5a and 5c)
C − P ′ (z)K = 0−−−− (6) .
Since P ′ (.) is a strictly monotonic function, we have in equilibrium
z = P ′−1
(
C
K
)
−−−−(7).
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Hence we have
zi =
∂z
∂i
= 0−−−−− (8a)
zr =
∂z
∂r
= 0−−−−(8b)
zC =
∂z
∂C
=
1
KP ′′
(
P ′−1
(
C
K
)) = 1
KP ′′ (z)
−−−− (8c)
and zK =
∂z
∂K
= −
C
K2P ′′ (z)
−−−− (8d) .
3.0.3 First stage
We now solve the first stage. In this stage the dominant moneylender chooses i to maximise
YM = (i− g)
[
F (i)− n (1− z)CF
]
.
Note that from the second stage equilibrium condition we know that z = z
(
i, C, r
)
and nCF = C.
The dominant moneylender will take this into account (like a Stackelberg leader) to maximise
YM = (i− g)
[
F (i)− (1− z)C
]
.
The conditions for maximisation are as follows. We use (8a), (8b) and (8c) to derive them.
YMi =
∂YM
∂i
= (i− g)F ′ (i) + F (i)−C (1− z) = 0−−− (9a)
and YMii =
∂2YM
∂i2
= (i− g)F ′′ (i) + 2F ′ (i) < 0−−(9b).
Note that (9b) is always satisfied since we have assumed that F ′ (.) < 0 and F ′′ (.) ≤ 0.
Subgame Perfect equilibrium Note that in our model the parameters are C, K, r and g. From
(5c), (7) and (9a) we can compute the subgame perfect equilibrium values of i, z and n (ieqm, zeqm
and neqm respectively). Plugging in the values of ieqm and zeqm in (3) we will get the equilibrium
value of CF .
By using (8a), (8b) and (8c) and (9a) we get the following.
YMir = C [(i− g) zir + zr] = 0−−−−(10a)
YM
iC
= − (1− z) +CzC = − (1− z) +
C
KP ′′ (z)
−−−−(10b)
and YMiK = CzK = −
C
2
K2P ′′ (z)
−−−− (10c)
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Also note that
dieqm
dr
= −
YMir
YMii
−−−−(11a)
dieqm
dC
= −
YM
iC
YMii
−−−−(11b)
and
dieqm
dK
= −
YMiK
YMii
−−−− (11c) .
In any non-trivial equilibrium where CF > 0 and z ∈ (0, 1) we get the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) ∂i
eqm
∂r
= 0. (ii) ∂i
eqm
∂C
< 0 provided either K is large enough compared to C or
P ′′ (z) is large enough (i.e. P (z) is sufficiently convex). (iii) di
eqm
dK
< 0.
Proof (i) Note YMii < 0 (9b) and Y
M
ir = 0 (10a). Hence from (11a) we get that
∂ieqm
∂r
= 0.
(ii) Since P ′′ (.) > 0 then C
KP ′′(z) > 0. However, if K is large enough compared to C then
C
K
is
sufficiently small. Since z < 1, − (1− z) < 0, and so we get that YM
iC
= − (1− z) + C
KP ′′(z) < 0 for
a sufficiently large K. For such a K we have ∂i
eqm
∂C
< 0. Similarly if P ′′ (z) is large enough then
YM
iC
= − (1− z) + C
KP ′′(z) < 0. This in turn implies that
∂ieqm
∂C
< 0. (iii) Since YMii < 0 the above
result follows straight from (10c) and (11c).
Comment We now try to provide some intuition behind proposition 1. If r decreases z does
not change as equation (7) does not contain r. This means that the effective amount of formal
credit injected into the system, C (1− z) remains unaffected which in turn implies that the informal
interest rate, i, in the new equilibrium will remain unchanged.
An increase in C, on the contrary, changes z. But the direction of change must depend on the
curvature of the P (.) function. As P ′′ (.) > 0 in a stable equilibrium, z rises. However, either if K
is sufficiently large relative to C or if P (.) is sufficiently convex, the increase in z is small (relative to
the increase in C) so that C(1− z) rises. In this situation also i falls as the existing moneylender’s
demand for informal credit falls.
If the government resorts to anticorruption measure in the form of an increase in K, P ′ (z) has
to fall (see equation 6). Consequently, z must decrease in a stable equilibrium. It decreases as
P ′′ (.) > 0, which in turn, implies a rise in C(1− z). As a consequence, the demand for informal
credit of the dominant moneylender falls which compels him to lower the informal interest rate, i.
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We now proceed to provide a few remarks on neqm (the number of fringe moneylenders who
actually get the credit in equilibrium). From (5c) we get that neqm = C
CF
.
Therefore
dneqm
dr
= −
dCF
dr
(CF )2
−−−−(12a)
and
dneqm
dC
=
1
(CF )2
[
CF −C
dCF
dC
]
−−−−(12b)
Since zr = 0 (from 8b) and C
F = 11−zf
′−1
(
1 + i− 1+r1−z
)
(from 3) and f ′′ (.) > 0 we get that
dCF
dr
< 0.
Therefore
dneqm
dr
= −
dCF
dr
(CF )2
> 0 −−−−(13).
Note that dz
eqm
dC
= zC . From (3) we have
dCF
dC
=
1
(1− z)2

 (1− z) 1f ′′(1+i− 1+r1−z )
(
dieqm
dC
− zC
1+r
(1−zeqm)2
)
+f ′−1
(
1 + i− 1+r1−z
)
zC

−−−−(14).
Therefore from (12b) and (14) it is clear that the sign of dn
eqm
dC
is ambiguous. We summarise this
result in terms of the following proposition.
Proposition 2 neqm always rises with r. However, the effect of an increase in C on neqm is
ambiguous.
Comment It may be noted that while the effect of increasing C on ieqm is ambiguous, with
reasonable restrictions on the parameters it is possible to have a scenario where neqm increases
with C. This will be shown in an example later.
We now provide some comparative static results. It may be noted that r, C and K are the
parameters of our model. The results are as follows. From the discussions above and using (8a-8d)
we obtain:
dY F
dr
= −CF −CF
[
(1 + i)− f ′ (.)
] dz
dr
= −CF < 0.
(
note that
dz
dr
= 0
)
dY F
dC
= −CF (1 + r)
dz
dC
< 0.
(
note that
dz
dC
> 0 as P ′′ (.) > 0
)
dY F
dK
= −CF (1 + r)
dz
dK
> 0.
(
as
dz
dK
< 0
)
10
Proposition 3 (i) Y F always increases with a fall in r. (ii) Y F increases following an increase
in K. (ii) Y F falls following an increase in C .
A decrease in the formal interest rate, r, lowers the opportunity cost of credit of every fringe
moneylender which in turn raises his net income. Besides, an increase in the gross volume of formal
credit, C, raises the bribing rate, z, charged by the bank official per unit of formal credit disbursed
to the new moneylenders as P ′′ (.) > 0 in the stable SPE. This affects their profitability adversely
and lowers their income. Finally, an anticorruption measure on the bank official lowers z and hence
improves earnings of the fringe moneylenders.
Differentiating the expression for YM and using equations (8a-8d) we get the following:
dYM
dr
= (i− g)C
dz
dr
= 0
dYM
dC
= − (i− g)
(
d (1− z)C
dC
)
< 0.

 Note that d(1−z)CdC > 0 if K is sufficiently large
relative to C or if P (.) is sufficiently convex.


dYM
dK
= (i− g)C
dz
dK
< 0.
Proposition 4 (i) A change in r cannot affect YM . (ii) An increase in C lowers YM in a stable
equilibrium. (iii) A rise in K lowers YM .
A credit subsidy policy in terms of a reduction in the formal interest rate cannot affect the
income of the dominant moneylender as it does not change the bribing rate. On the other hand,
although an increase in C raises the bribing rate, it may also lead to an increase in the net volume
of formal credit, C (1− z), injected into the system, provided K is sufficiently large relative to C
and/or P (.) is sufficiently convex. If this happens, the aggregate demand for informal credit of the
moneylender falls and this affects his profitably adversely. Furthermore, an increase inK lowers the
official’s bribing rate which in turn raises the net volume of formal credit injected into the system.
The dominant moneylender in such a situation has no alternative but to charge a lower informal
interest rate that also affects his profitability unfavourably.
From the bank officer’s maximisation exercise the following may also be noted.
dY O
dr
= 0,
dY O
dC
= z > 0 and
dY O
dK
= −P (.) < 0
Consequently, we have the following result.
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Proposition 5 (i) dY O/dr = 0 (ii) dY O/dC > 0 and (iii) dY O/dK < 0.
A credit subsidy policy, if undertaken through a reduction in the formal interest rate, cannot
affect the income of the official as bribing rate he charges remains unaffected. Besides, the official
has to lower the bribing rate following an anticorruption measure which in turn affects his income
negatively. Finally, an increase in C enables the official to earn a higher bribe income when he
behaves optimally and chooses the bribing rate.
3.1 An example
Let us have the following.
f (x) =
1
2
x2, P (z) = zα where α > 0 and α = 1,
F (i) = 100− i and g = 0.
Note that P ′ (z) = αzα−1 > 0 for all z > 0. P ′′ (z) = α (α− 1) zα−2. Hence if α ∈ (0, 1) then
P ′′ (z) < 0 and if α ∈ (1,∞) then P ′′ (z) > 0. This means all the assumptions of our model are
satisfied in the example.
Using (3) we get
CF (i, z, r) =
(1 + i) (1− z)− (1 + r)
(1− z)2
−−−−(16)
Routine computation shows that in our example
zeqm =
(
C
αK
) 1
α−1
−−−− (17a)
ieqm =
1
2

100−C

1−( C
αK
) 1
α−1



−−−− (17b)
and neqm =
C
(
1−
(
C
αK
) 1
α−1
)2
[
1 + 12
{
100−C
(
1−
(
C
αK
) 1
α−1
)}][
1−
(
C
αK
) 1
α−1
]
− (1 + r)
−−−− (17c) .
Note that
dieqm
dC
=
1
2

−1 +( C
αK
) 1
α−1
(
α
α− 1
)−−−− (18) .
If α ∈ (0, 1) then P ′′ (z) < 0 and di
eqm
dC
< 0 (check proposition 1).
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To illustrate the case of α > 1 (i.e P ′′ (.) > 0) we take α = 2. For this particular value of α, we
have
dieqm
dC
=
1
2
[
−1 +
C
K
]
< 0 iff K > C.
The above shows that there are reasonable parametric restrictions which satisfy conditions of corol-
lary 1.
To check that it is possible for neqm to increase with C we try with two possible values of α.
If α = 12 (which implies P
′′ (z) < 0) then from (17c)
neqm =
C
(
1−
(
2C
K
)
−2
)2
[
1 + 12
{
100−C
(
1−
(
2C
K
)
−2
)}][
1−
(
2C
K
)
−2
]
− (1 + r)
−−−− (19) .
In this particular case
∂neqm
∂C
= 16
(
K2 − 4C
2
) −800C4 + 12K2C2 + 16rC4 + 51K4 + 12K2C2r(
−1600C
3
+ 408K2C + 16C
4
− 8K2C
2
+K4 + 32C
3
r
)2 −−−− (19a) .
Note that if K
C
≥ 2 then K2 − 4C
2
≥ 0 and K4 ≥ 16C
4
=⇒ 51K4 ≥ 816C
4
> 800C
4
. Using this
in the above equation (19a) we get that neqm rises with C (when α = 12).
To check for the case where P ′′ (z) > 0 we take α = 2. For this case
neqm =
C
(
1− C2K
)2
[
1 + 12
{
100−C
(
1− C2K
)}] [
1− C2K
]
− (1 + r)
−−−− (20)
Here we have
∂neqm
∂C
= 16
(
2K −C
)
K
100K2 − 150CK − 2K2r + 51C
2
+ 3KCr(
−400K2 + 204CK + 4K2C − 4C
2
K +C
3
+ 8K2r
)2
= 16K2
(
2K −C
) (2K − 3C) (50− r) + 51C2(
−400K2 + 204CK + 4K2C − 4C
2
K +C
3
+ 8K2r
)2 −−−− (20a) .
Note that since r is the formal sector rate of interest it is reasonable to suppose that r < 50 (i.e.
formal sector rate of interest is less than 5000%). From (20a) we get that ifK > 32C then
∂neqm
∂C
> 0.
Our example clearly illustrates the main results derived in our paper.
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4 Conclusion
Development economists have concerns regarding the efficacy of the policy of forging a vertical
linkage between the formal and informal credit markets in achieving its primary objective to en-
hance competition and improve the borrowing terms faced by the small and marginal farmers. It
has been shown in the literature that such a policy may be counterproductive under asymmetric
information among informal sector lenders. In this context, we analyse some issues that have not
been adequately examined in the earlier works. In this paper we show that even without any asym-
metric information problems, this policy may fail in the presence of corruption in the distribution of
formal credit. We also show that any change in the formal sector interest rate has no effect on the
informal interest rate while an anticorruption measure (increase in penalty) unambiguously lowers
the interest rate in the informal credit market. Finally, we also examine the effects of alternative
policies on the incomes of different economic agents.
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